Although there are many benefits associated with loan workouts, they can suffer from drawbacks that make them unsuitable for all cases of corporate distress.

The principal problem is that they need all the participants affected by the terms of a workout to agree to its terms. This can create a ‘hold-out’ problem, whereby one or more disgruntled creditor can demand disproportionately preferential terms in exchange for their consent. Similarly, parties not necessarily directly affected by the loan workout, for example trade creditors, may seek to improve their position by taking, or threatening to take, legal action to recover their exposures to a company. This can undermine the entire process.

In addition, the structure of the creditor group in amulti-creditor workout can have a considerable impact on its effectiveness. The larger this group is, and the more divergent its interests are, the more difficult and time-consuming the process of developing a consensus is likely to be. For example, a loan workout involving a significant number of banks, purchasers of distressed debt, bondholders and shareholders, with each group potentially having conflicting objectives, may not be possible to agree without some form of recourse to the courts.